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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
equally as innocent in nature as are hypodermic syringes, and it
eases the burden of prosecution by placing the burden of proving
innocent intention on the possessor.
Lamar E. Ozley, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - INTOXICATION AND SPECIFIC INTENT
IN HOMICIDE PROSECUTION
In a prosecution for murder' there was evidence that the de-
fendants had been drinking intoxicants shortly before the shoot-
ing. The trial judge charged the jury that voluntary intoxica-
tion could never be a defense to a crime2 and refused to instruct
the jury that they could consider the voluntary intoxication of
those defendants who had not actually fired the gun insofar as
intoxication might bear on whether or not they are principals. 3
On appeal of the conviction, held, reversed. Although the charge
requested by the defendants was improper, the charge given by
the judge was incomplete and constituted reversible error, for it
denied the defendants "the right to have the jury pass on the
factual question of whether they were in such an intoxicated con-
dition as to preclude the presence of a specific criminal intent. ' '4
State v. Youngblood, 106 So.2d 689 (La. 1958).
The Louisiana Criminal Code provides that criminal intent
may be either general or specific and defines specific criminal
intent as "that state of mind which exists when the circum-
stances indicate that the offender actively desired the proscribed
criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." 5 The
cotics sufficient to support a presumption of knowledge, unless defendant could
explain or rebut such presumption, was constitutional).
1. LA. R.S. 14:30(1) (1950) : "Murder is the killing of a human being, (1)
When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm."
Felony murder defined in clause (2) of this article is not applicable to this situa-
tion.
2. State v. Youngblood, 106 So.2d 689, 690 (La. 1958) : "I charge you further
that voluntary intoxication is no defense under the law for having committed a
crime while so intoxicated."
3. Ibid. Trial judge refused the following charge requested by defendants:
"However, a partial or total intoxication may be considered by you in weighing
the behavior and conduct of the defendants as you may find were not guilty of
actually triggering the weapon that killed [the deceased], insofar as such behavior
or conduct may bear on whether or not they were aiders, abetters, counsellors, or
procurers."
4. Id. at 691.
5. LA. R.S. 14:10(1) (1950). Clause (2) of this article defines general intent
as being present "whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circum-
stances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience,
[Vol. XIX
1959] NOTES
crime of murder requires "a specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm."6 Thus, drunkenness, 7 if it exists to such an
extent as to preclude the existence of a specific intent to kill or
seriously injure, will constitute a defense8 To state broadly that
extreme voluntary intoxication is a defense as the statute im-
plies, however, is inaccurate, for the person who has become vol-
untarily intoxicated is generally held to the same criminal re-
sponsibility as the sober man.9 Rather it should be said that an
extreme degree of intoxication may be found to preclude the ex-
istence of an element of the crime, i.e., the specific intent which
must accompany the proscribed act. Even then, intoxication is
treated as a special defense and must be established by the de-
fendant. 10 Certain specific situations must, however, be dis-
tinguished from the case where voluntary drunkenness may pre-
vent the existence of the necessary specific intent. If the defend-
ant drinks for the purpose of securing the courage necessary for
the perpetration of the crime, or, if having the courage and the
specific intent, he incidentally becomes intoxicated, this intoxi-
cation will not constitute a defense." In most instances, a per-
son, though intoxicated, is still capable of forming the specific
must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain
to result."
Id. 14:11: "The definitions of some crimes require a specific criminal intent,
while in others no intent is required. Some crimes consist merely of criminal neg-
ligence that produces criminal consequences. However, in the absence of qualify-
ing provisions, the terms 'intent' and "intentional' have reference to 'general crim-
inal intent'."
See State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 91
(1955), rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 955 (1956) (aggravated rape requires no spe-
cific intent, hence intoxication could not be a defense thereto) ; State v. Johnston,
207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945) (aggravated assault requires only a general
criminal intent, hence intoxication could not be a defense).
6. See note 7 supra.
7. LA. R.S. 14:15 (1950) provides that intoxication may be a defense whether
it results from the voluntary use of alcoholic beverages or the voluntary use of
narcotics.
8. Ibid.: "The fact of an intoxicated or drugged condition of the offender at
the time of the commission of the crime is immaterial, except as follows: (1)
[involuntary intoxication], (2) Where the circumstances indicate that an intoxi-
cated or drugged condition has precluded the presence of a specific criminal intent
or of special knowledge required in a particular crime, this fact constitutes a de-
fense to a prosecution for that crime." (Emphasis added.) See also State v.
Alexander, 215 La. 245, 40 So.2d 232 (1949) ; State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30
So.2d 830 (1947) ; State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945).
9. CLARK & MAsirALL, LAW OF CRIMES 385 (6th ed. 1958).
10. State v. Hill, 46 La. Ann. 27, 14 So. 294 (1894) (intoxication is a special
defense and, if relied on, must be proven by the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. It is not for the state, once evidence of intoxication is introduced, to prove
a negative, i.e., that the accused was not so drunk as to preclude the presence of
the requisite specific intent, but for the accused to prove that he was intoxicated
to that extent).
11. See State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766, 22 So. 254, 62 Am. St. Rep. 664
(1897) ; State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086 (1880).
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intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. In fact, this partic-
ular mental state seems to be encouraged by the consumption of
intoxicants. 12
The instant case is in accord with a number of early Louisi-
ana cases" decided prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Crim-
inal Code of 1942, and with cases decided subsequent to 1942.
These cases clearly establish the principle that voluntary intoxi-
cation to a degree sufficient to preclude the presence of a specific
intent will constitute a defense to those crimes requiring a spe-
cific criminal intent. 4 However, as pointed out above, the de-
fendant's burden of proof will be extremely difficult to meet.
There is, also, the practical consideration that a jury may be
hesitant to allow voluntary intoxication to relieve the accused
of criminal responsibility. Some juries may well feel, especially
in crimes of force and violence, that drunkenness aggravates the
crime, though this is not the law.'5
In a prosecution for murder where the jury finds that the
12. See State v. Newman, 157 La. 564, 102 So. 671 (1925) (drunkenness is
often the cause of a crime).
13. State v. Hogan, 117 La. 863, 42 So. 352 (1906) (in absence of evidence of
premeditation, intoxication may be invoked to negative malice or deliberate intent,
but it must be of such a character as to create a state of mental confusion, pre-
cluding a specific intent to take life). See also State v. Trivas, 32 La. Ann. 1086
(1880), which was relied on in the Hogan case.
State v. Kraemer, 49 La. Ann. 766, 771, 22 So. 254, 256, 62 Am. St. Rep. 664,
668 (1897), where the court relied on Bishop's theory that the wrongful intent to
become intoxicated will supply the criminal intent needed to convict for a crime
committed as a direct result of the intoxication, but also recognized that this fic-
tion could not supply the element of specific intent. See generally Bisnop, CRim-
INAL LAW c. 27, paras. 397-410 (6th ed. 1877). When a man "not meaning to
commit a homicide, becomes so drunk as to become incapable of intending to do
it, and then, in this condition, kills a man [it cannot be murder in the first degree
because there is no specific intent to take life]."
. State v. Willis, 43 La. Ann. 407, 9 So. 11 (1891) (judge properly charged to
effect that if accused was so drunk as to be incapable of having the specific intent
charged he could not be found guilty, but if he had mind enough to comprehend
his actions and to know right from wrong, drunkenness is not an excuse).
14. State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954), aff'd, 350 U.S. 91
(1955), rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 955 (1956) (objection to statement made by
defense that drunkenness was a defense to crime of aggravated rape properly sus-
tained on the theory that aggravated rape was not such crime as required a spe-
cific intent); State v. Alexander, 215 La. 245, 254, 40 So.2d 232, 234 (1949)
(drunkenness "is a defense when there is mania and in certain cases provided it
can be used to negative an intent where a specific intent is required") ; State v.
Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947) (murder conviction affirmed, though trial
judge simply read R.S. 14:15 to jury and refused to give a charge which was not
incorrect) ; State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So.2d 741 (1945) (conviction of
aggravated assault affirmed on grounds that assault requires only a general crim-
inal intent, hence accused was not entitled to invoke R.S. 14:15 (intoxication) as
a defense).
15. State v. Newman, 157 La. 564, 102 So. 671 (1925) (murder conviction set
aside because judge charged jury to effect that drunkenness, when voluntary, ag-
gravates the crime in the sense of making it a worse crime).
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defendant was so intoxicated as to preclude the presence of a
specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, the appro-
priate verdict might well be manslaughter. Manslaughter is de-
fined a's "a homicide without any intent to cause death or great
bodily harm when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration . . .of any intentional misdemeanor di-
rectly affecting the person."' 6 Thus, if death results from a bat-
tery, either aggravated or simple, the elements of the crime of
manslaughter are present. Intoxication could not be used as a
defense to the battery which would be the basis of the man-
slaughter charge because battery requires only a general crim-
inal intent, which under the law is not precluded by intoxication.
Therefore, any charge to the jury on intoxication would be mis-
leading if it did not include an explanation of its application to
this responsive verdict. The Louisiana Supreme Court has ap-
proved the practice of simply reading R.S. 14:15 to the jury in
order to instruct them on the law relative to intoxication as a
defense.'7 However, this is an area where a bare statement of
the law is likely to confuse a jury. It will greatly facilitate a
proper jury understanding of the issues involved if the judge
elaborates upon the application of the intoxication article to the
crime charged and to the crimes which may be responsive
verdicts.
Allen B. Pierson, Jr.
EVIDENCE- GENERAL HUSBAND-WIFE PRIVILEGE
IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
Defendant was convicted, under the Mann Act,' for trans-
porting the prosecutrix from Arkansas into Oklahoma for im-
moral purposes. During the trial defendant's wife was allowed,
over his objection, to testify that she was a prostitute and that
the prosecutrix was coming to Oklahoma to go into business with
her. Defendant claimed the husband-wife privilege and the gov-
ernment contended that the wife's testimony was allowable be-
cause it was given voluntarily. The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the district court in allowing the wife to testify
voluntarily. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, held, reversed.
In the interests of fostering peace in the family, a spouse will
not be permitted to testify against the other, even voluntarily,
16. LA. R.S. 14:31(2a) (1950). Clauses (1) and (2b) defining manslaughter
in other ways are not applicable here.
17. State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769, 30 So.2d 830 (1947).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1949).
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